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a person unlawfully on premises where a search occurs can not complain
if evidence obtained during the search is used against him. Anyone
else is, and should be, protected from unlawful official invasion of

privacy.
Jurisdiction-Habeas Corpus-State Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Questions Pending in Federal Court. In July, 1960, petitioner
Don Anthony White was convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction,1 and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.2 In February 1964, the Washington court denied petitioner's
application for writ of habeas corpus.' Petitioner then applied for writ
of habeas corpus in the federal district court. This petition raised a

new issue based on facts asserted to have come to the attention of
petitioner's counsel subsequent to the denial of the application by the

Washington court." Respondent penitentiary superintendant maintained that petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies in regard
to this issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254.1 The district court
ordered that the cause be held in abeyance subject to petitioner's sub-

mission of a new application to the state supreme court. Upon petitioner's application to the Washington Supreme Court for writ of habeas
I State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962).
2

White v. Washington, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
re White v. Rhay, 64 Wn.2d 15, 390 P2d 535 (1964).
4The
petition, as quoted in Judge Finley's opinion, read in part as follows:
"4. Petitioner was held in police custody, and questioned over a period of eleven
days before he was provided with counsel; and because of his weakened mental and
physical condition during such custody, without counsel, and without having had a
hearing before a magistrate, the entire circumstance of the police procedure was intimidating and coercive.
VII. Petitioner was denied due process and the guarantees of the Sixth Amend8 In

ment to the Constitution of the United States because he was not provided counsel when
needed, and because his physical and mental condition was so debilitated and diseased
that he could not intelligently or competently waive the right to counsel, about which
he was not informed and which the record discloses, he knew nothing about. The
admission and confessions of petitioner, made without advice of counsel, and introduced
at trial, violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights.
1. The record discloses that petitioner was at no time advised that he did not have to
give a statement or to submit to interrogation, and there are no facts from which any
inference can be drawn that petitioner knew or understood that he had a right to remain
silent." 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 714, 399 P2d at 537.
528 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958), provides in part: "An application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State. .. ." In Duffy v. Wells, 201 F.2d 503, 504 (9th Cir. 1952), it
was stated: "Section 2254 does not deny jurisdictionwhere the state remedies have not
been exhausted. That section provides only that the application shall not be 'granted'
unless it appears that the state remedies have been exhausted. .. ." (Emphasis added.)
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corpus, held: When a federal district court assumes and retains jurisdiction over a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Washington
Supreme Court will decline to consider the petition. In re White v.
Rhay, 65 Wash. Dec.2d 688, 399 P.2d 522 (1965).
Although seven of the nine members of the Washington court voted
for dismissal, no more than four judges could agree on a basis of decision.6 Judge Donworth, writing the opinion of the court, reasoned for
four judges that, when the federal court has assumed jurisdiction, the
state court can no longer have jurisdiction;' furthermore, even if the
state court did have jurisdiction in such a situation, it should decline
to exercise it.' Chief Justice Rosellini concurred in the result reached
in this opinion. Judge Hamilton found state jurisdiction, but concurred
on the ground that comity requires deference to the invoked jurisdiction
of the federal court.' Chief Justice Rosellini joined in an opinion
written by Judge Hale which concurred on the basis that petitioner
had exhausted his state remedies.10 Two members of the court, in an
6

The opinion of the court stated: "[A] majority of the court is of the opinion
that... this court presently has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding." 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 689, 399 P.2d at 522. The alignment of the judges does not
support this statement. Chief Justice Rosellini concurred in the result of the opinion
of the court, but he also apparently concurred, without reservation, in an opinion in
which Judge Hale concluded that the Washington court had jurisdiction. Id. at 712,
399 P.2d at 531.
The conclusions in this opinion, as to the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court
and its lack of authority to hold the cause in abeyance, were inferred from the language
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958), note 4 supra, and 28 U.S.C. 2243 (1958), the latter providing in part:
"A court... entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith
award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ
should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant... is
not entitled thereto.... The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts and
dispose of the matter as law and justice require."
In Duffy v. Wells, 201 F2d 503 (9th Cir. 1952), the district court retained jurisdiction
of an application for writ of habeas corpus while the applicant petitioned the California
court. Following denial of the petition by the state court, the district court granted the
writ. On appeal from the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit stated:
"Section 2243 provides that 'The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts,
and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' We think that [the district
court's] action in so retaining jurisdiction is what law and justice required." 201 F2d

at 504-05.
8

"It seems to us that the only way to settle the issues raised by the petitioner once
and for all is in one direct and complete proceeding in the only court with the final
authority to hold the necessary hearings and decide the questions of fact and law,
namely the federal district court... !' (emphasis in original) 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 701,
399 P.2d at 530.
o judge Hamilton's primary concern was avoiding "an Alphonse and Gaston approach
in bouncing the 'evidentiary hearing ball' back and forth." 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 703,
399 P.2d at 531.
10 judge Hale found continued jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings in the
Washington court based upon art. 4, § 4 of the Washington Constitution. He denied
that any court, other than the United States Supreme Court, could divest the state
court of such jurisdiction. He concluded, however, with the interesting but unsupported
argument that since habeas corpus is not subject to the doctrine of res judicata, "exhaus-
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opinion written by Judge Finley, argued in dissent that the state court
had concurrent jurisdiction, and that petitioner's application raised a
new issue which had not been considered at the state level. 1
The four judges who found no state jurisdiction based their determination on the premise that jurisdiction once assumed by a district
court is exclusive. This view of exclusive federal jurisdiction is, however, diametrically opposed to that expressed by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the recent case of Blair v. California'2 The court
in Blair replied upon earlier Ninth Circuit decisions"3 in holding that a
district court may hold an application for writ of habeas corpus in
abeyance for a reasonable time in order to allow petitioner to exhaust
his state remedies in regard to a particular issue.
The position of a majority of the Washington court, that jurisdiction
would not be exercised even if it existed, raises major policy questions
about the court's proper role in the federal judicial scheme. The common basis of all three concurring opinions is that the bouncing of a
petition from federal court to state court and again back to federal
court results in needless expense and delay. But equal consideration
should be given to the argument that the habeas corpus remedy, which
by its nature is never totally foreclosed, involves expense and delay as
an unavoidable concomitant to insuring that a prisoner is not detained
in violation of his fundamental liberties."
At least two other arguments favor exercise of jurisdiction by the
Washington court in this type of case. First, comity suggests that a
state court should accept the opportunity to reconsider earlier decisions
in light of newly discovered evidence or a subsequent United States
Supreme Court decision. Careful consideration of potential error in
the state court will reduce chances of reversal in the federal courts.
tion of state remedies" can only refer to remedies available by way of direct challenge.
Compare Blair v. California, 340 F2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965), as discussed in note 11
infra. Petitioner had admittedly exhausted his direct remedies.
11 The concept that an adverse state court ruling on a particular issue is necessary
to establish exhaustion of state remedies on that issue is strictly in keeping with the
decision in Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 12 and 13 infra.
12340 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1965).
IsThomas v. Teets, 205 F2d 236 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,346 U.S. 910 (1954);
Lee Fong Fook v. Wixon, 170 F2d 245 (9th Cir. 1948).
14 The opinion of the court in the principal case quoted the following passage from
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963):
"State prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas corpus only upon showing that
their detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded against
state action by the Federal Constitution. Simply because detention so obtained is intolerable, the opportunity to be heard, to argue and present evidence, must never be totally
foreclosed." 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 695, 399 P.2d at 526. Compare the statement, also
from the opinion of the court, quoted in note 8 supra.
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Second, state courts can, and should, share the burden of considering
the increasing volume of habeas corpus applications which are being
presented to the federal district courts'
Petitioner's state remedies now are exhausted." The federal district
court, following the pattern prescribed in Blair,7 may now decide to
hold an evidentiary hearing and, perhaps, grant the writ of habeas

corpus.
EVIDENCE
Effect of Tortfeasor's Death Upon Admissibility of Blood Test in
Civil Action. The question whether analyses of blood samples taken
from a deceased person may be admitted into evidence in a civil suit is
one of first impression in Washington. Plaintiff, a truck-owner, sued
decedent's executor for damages to his truck sustained in a collision
with decedent's automobile, alleging that decedent was negligent in
driving under the influence of intoxicants. A blood sample was taken
by a coroner, in accordance with Washington Revised Code section
68.08.106,1 approximately one hour after death. Analysis of decedent's
blood sample was admitted into evidence over defendant's objection, as
proof of decedent's intoxication. On appeal from a jury verdict for
plaintiff, held: Analysis of a blood sample lawfully taken from a deceased person by a coroner is admissible into evidence in a civil suit.
Zenith Transport, Ltd. v. Bellingham Nat'l Bank, 64 Wn.2d 967, 395
P.2d 498 (1964).2

The language of Washington Revised Code section 68.08.106, allow1r See Becker, Collateral Post-Conviction Review-View of a District Judge, 33
F.R.D. 452, 491 (1963) ; Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTv L. REv. 423 (1961).
36 "If no state remedy is available or if, pursuing it, the state prisoner fails to obtain
the relief desired, exhaustion of state remedies would be established and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 would not stand in the way of federal habeas corpus." Blair v. California, 340
F2d 741 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
7In blair,the district court was ordered to hold the defendant's petition in abeyance
pending his application to the California court. The issue involved denial of counsel to
petitioner on appeal from his California conviction, in light of the Supreme Court
ecision in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). If the defendant failed to obtain
the relief desired from the California court, the district court was then to consider the
petition.

1 "[T]he coroner, upon his own authority or upon the request of the prosecuting
attorney ... may make or cause to be made an analysis of the stomach contents, blood,
or organs, or tissues of a deceased person and secure professional opinions thereon and
retain any specimens or organs of the deceased which in his discretion are desirable or
needful for anatomic, bacteriological, chemical or toxilogical examination or upon lawful request are needed or desired for evidence to be presented in court. Costs shall be
borne by the county." (1953).
2 The court remanded the case for a new trial on another ground.

